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ABSTRACT
Public investments in repairs, modernization, and construction of schools cost billions. However,
little is known about the nature of school facility investments, whether such investments actually change
the physical condition of public schools, and the subsequent causal impacts on student achievement. We
study the achievement effects of nearly 1,400 capital campaigns initiated and financed by local school
districts, comparing districts where school capital bonds were either narrowly approved or narrowly
defeated by district voters. Overall, we find little evidence that school capital campaigns improve student
achievement. Our event-study analyses focusing on students that attend targeted schools and therefore are
exposed to major campus renovations also generate very precise zero estimates of achievement effects.
Thus, locally financed school capital campaigns—the predominant method through which facility
investments are made—may represent a limited tool for realizing substantial gains in student achievement
or closing achievement gaps.
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The Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966) ignited an enduring debate on the importance
of school spending by concluding that school resources play a limited role in improving student
outcomes. Many empirical studies followed, with some concluding that there is no systematic
relationship between school resources and student outcomes (Hanushek 1986) and others
concluding the opposite (Card and Krueger 1996; Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine 1996; Jackson,
Johnson, and Persico 2015). While these studies typically examine the impacts of instructional
resources (e.g., teacher compensation and class size), the physical condition of school buildings
is another important component of school resources.
State and local governments invest an enormous amount in public school facilities, with
annual expenditures totaling about $66 billion (or $1,344 per student; NCES 2012).1 Despite the
magnitude of such investments, many students, especially those from disadvantaged
backgrounds, attend schools that are in a state of disrepair (Filardo et al. 2010), and $300 billion
in deferred maintenance is needed to bring U.S. schools into “good” condition (ASCE 2009).
The prevalence of public schools in need of repair is worrisome, because poor physical
environments may impede student achievement if students learn more easily in safe, clean,
controlled environments (Jones and Zimmer 2001).
Indeed, recent evidence on the impacts of very large construction projects in contexts
where school facilities were either in very poor condition or nonexistent suggests that new school
construction projects can improve student outcomes (Aaronson and Mazumder 2011; Duflo
2001; Nielson and Zimmerman 2014). For instance, Nielson and Zimmerman find positive
effects on reading achievement of a construction project financed through state and federal
sources that cost $70,000 per pupil and involved rebuilding almost every school campus in an
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The scope of these investments can also be seen by noting that $407 billion in outstanding taxpayersupported bond debt is attributed to school facilities (Dixon 2012).
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urban district (located in New Haven, Connecticut). However, this type of capital campaign is
atypical in the United States where school capital projects (both renovations and new
construction) are primarily financed locally through the issuance of voter-approved bonds that
are repaid with property taxes.2 For instance, the average per-pupil size of capital campaigns in
Texas, the state we study in this paper, is about $7,800. The achievement effects of investments
of this magnitude remain unclear. Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) find that school bond
passage in California increases housing prices, but they only find modest and imprecisely estimated
effects on student achievement.

In this paper, we provide the most comprehensive assessment to date of achievement
effects from school facility investments initiated and financed by local school districts. The first
part of the analysis examines the impact of nearly 1,400 capital campaigns initiated by 748
school districts in the state of Texas over a 14-year period. To address the concern that districts
conducting such campaigns are different from those that do not, we use dynamic regressiondiscontinuity methods (Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein 2010) to compare school districts where
bond referenda narrowly pass to those where they narrowly fail. We examine the impact of
capital campaigns on student outcomes using information on all tested students in the state over
this time period, which includes all third through eighth graders and tenth or eleventh graders
that take the state’s high school exit exam.3
We find clear evidence that locally funded campaigns lead to large increases in capital
investment that are concentrated in the first two postelection years. Crucially, we find no effects
on operating spending or on average class size, suggesting that funds raised through bonds
“stick” to the capital account and are not reallocated to operating costs. We also find little
2

In the United States, 88 percent of funding for capital investment comes from local school districts.
In contrast, Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein construct a sporadic panel of test scores spanning many
different tests for third and fourth graders.
3
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evidence that capital campaigns attract students into school districts or help districts retain
teachers. We also find that locally financed capital campaigns lead to measurable yet modest
changes in facility conditions. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to look at the causal
effect of typical bond-funded capital campaigns on the actual schooling environments of
students. Three years after bond passage, average district-wide campus age decreases by merely
1.4 years, time since last major renovation or building construction decreases by 6.5 years, and
the share of students enrolled in schools opened in the past four years increases by 3.6
percentage points on a base of 6 percent. Capital campaigns increase the likelihood that older
schools are in at least fair or good condition; they also alleviate overcrowding in older schools
(although overall district effects are insignificant).
Despite the investment, we find little evidence that school capital campaigns improve
student outcomes. Our main regression discontinuity(RD) point estimates for grades thrree to
eight are a small 0.016 and 0.030 standard deviation increase for reading and math, respectively,
in year six (p-values = 0.438, 0.269), and we can rule out effects as large as 0.06 and 0.08.4
Estimates are smaller or negative prior to year six. Difference-in-differences models (comparing
districts before and after bond passage or failure) can rule out achievement effects greater than
0.03 and 0.05 for reading and math, respectively. The comparability of RD and difference-indifference estimates suggests that the effects of bond passage for marginal and inframarginal
elections are similar, so the effects do not obviously vary with the support for bond passage.
Given that typical capital campaigns deliver only modest facility improvements for the
average student, it may be unsurprising that overall achievement effects are also small. Most
students simply do not attend schools that received large capital investments. To address this
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Student sorting does not drive the findings, as we find little evidence that school capital campaigns
encourage in-district migration among students.
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issue, the second part of the study directly measures the effect of capital investment on students
actually exposed to it by analyzing more than 1,300 major campus renovations and 250 campus
openings using an event-study research design. Controls for lagged individual test scores permit
us to address changes in student composition resulting from capital investment, analogous to
“value-added” models of teacher effectiveness. With or without this adjustment, we find no
evidence of achievement effects of major campus renovations, even for renovations that appear
to have generated large improvements in school facility conditions. Our estimates are sufficiently
precise that we can rule out positive effects larger than about 0.013 for math and 0.016 for
reading for the first four years following a campus renovation. Thus, capital spending on campus
renovations has achievement effects an order of magnitude smaller than class-size reductions
with similar cost. The study results for campus opening events are more imprecise and sensitive
to the sample used, but we do not find consistent evidence of achievement gains resulting from
building new schools.
Taken together, our analysis of capital campaigns and major renovations suggests that the
typical school facility investments initiated and financed by local school districts do not generate
appreciable improvements in student achievement.
We describe the context of facilities funding in Texas and its implications for student
outcomes in the next section. Following that, we describe our data sources and methods,
respectively. Next we present our main RD results for district spending, school conditions, and
student achievement, and event-study estimates of the effect of campus renovations and
openings. We then interpret the magnitudes and cost-effectiveness of capital interventions and
provide concluding remarks.

4

SCHOOL FACILITY SPENDING IN TEXAS AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON
STUDENT OUTCOMES
In 2008, total funding for Texas public schools was $10,600 per student, of which $1,280
(12 percent) was spent on school facilities. The vast majority of these funds are raised internally
by local school districts. State and federal funding each account for about 10 percent of facility
spending, with the remainder coming from districts (U.S. Department of Education 2010, Table
181; Filardo et al. 2010).5 Thus, modernization, renovations, and repairs of Texas public
educational facilities are financed primarily through local property taxes with minimal state
support, a setting typical of most states.
In Texas, local districts are fiscally independent and have taxing authority with which to
raise funds for capital improvements, principally by issuing bonds. A share of property tax
revenue is then used to pay debt service costs (principal and interest). Voters must approve bond
referenda by a simple majority to issue school bonds and to pass the associated, concurrent
increase in property taxes. An example of a ballot proposition for one Texas school capital
campaign is for the Ector County school district:
Shall the Board of Trustees of Ector County Independent School District be
authorized to issue bonds of the District as authorized by law at the time of the
issuance thereof, in one or more series, in the aggregate principal amount not
to exceed $129,750,000, for the construction and renovation and equipping of
high school facilities, the construction and equipment of elementary school
facilities and the acquisition of any necessary school sites and new school
buses, with any surplus proceeds to be used for the construction, renovation
and equipping of other school facilities in the District; with the bonds to
mature, bear interest, and be issued and sold in accordance with law at
the time of issuance; and shall the Board of Trustees be authorized to levy and
5

Texas has a well-known school finance program, the Foundation School Program (FSP), developed to
address historical disparities in per-pupil funding across districts. This policy determines the amount of state and
local funding for school districts and also determines the allocation of state funds to local districts. FSP aims to
ensure that all districts receive “substantially equal access to similar revenue per student at similar tax effort,” taking
into account all state and local tax revenues of districts, student and district cost differences, and differences in
property wealth (Texas Education Code, §42.001[b]). However, FSP mainly covers operational expenditures;
responsibility for facility spending falls primarily on school districts.
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pledge, and cause to be assessed and collected, annual ad valorem taxes, on all
taxable property in the District, sufficient, without limit as to rate or amount,
to pay the principal of and interest on the bonds and the cost of any credit
agreements executed in connection with the bonds?
The language is typical of school ballot propositions calling for bond financing for a capital
campaign to construct and renovate schools, but it also calls for providing funds for land
acquisition and the purchase of new school buses. Recent evidence suggests that Texas capital
campaigns targeting renovations as opposed to new construction are more likely to be approved.
Also, districts with larger fractions of Hispanics and fewer persons 65 and older are more likely
to approve bonds (Bowers and Lee 2009). In 2010, total outstanding debt from bonds issued by
Texas districts for school facilities was $63 billion (Dixon 2012).
Although the state supports districts’ ability to raise capital inexpensively through a
variety of loan assistance programs, large school infrastructure needs still exist, particularly in
poor districts.6 A 1991 census of all school facilities indicated that Texas districts had significant
unmet needs, with the cost of meeting them between $2 and 3 billion (1990 dollars), including
replacing space rated below “fair” condition, relieving overcrowding and portable space use, and
adding space for science labs and libraries. Furthermore, “buildings in poor districts are in worse
condition than those in wealthy districts” (Texas Education Agency 1992).
More recent evidence suggests that unmet capital needs remain. For instance, the 614
districts responding to a 1997 survey anticipated a total of $9 billion in repairs, renovations, and
new construction over the next five years, with critically needed repairs costing $4.1 billion
(TCPA 1998). Needs tended to be greater in heavily minority districts. In a 2006 survey, 6
percent of districts reported that their instructional facilities were in “poor” condition or

6

Examples of state programs to facilitate school bond issuance include the Guaranteed Bond program, the
instructional Facilities Allotment program, and the widely used Existing Debt Allotment. See Clark (2001) for a
history of Texas facilities funding.
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warranted replacement (TCPA 2006). Also, a substantially higher rate of instructional portable
space was reported in use in districts with many economically disadvantaged students. In
summary, although the Texas school financing system helps equalize operational spending
across districts, wide disparities in facility conditions and capital investments remain.7
These disparities and the overall prevalence of schools in poor condition in Texas are
worrisome to the extent that physical school environments affect student outcomes. There are
several reasons why such effects may exist. For instance, schools may have overcrowded
classrooms that can impede teaching and student learning (Rivera-Batiz and Marti 1995).
Another possibility is that outdated, malfunctioning building systems can lead to poor indoor air
quality, ventilation, and temperature control (Mendell and Heath 2005). Substandard facilities
may thus result in chronic distractions and missed school days (Earthman 2002). Older schools,
which have not been renovated or whose building systems have not been retrofitted, may not
have the infrastructure to support the latest technology (Lyons 1999) or could lack modernized
labs for science education. Low-quality educational facilities could dampen enthusiasm and
effort on the part of teachers (Uline and Tschannen-Moran 2008), thereby affecting teacher
retention, which could in turn affect student performance (Buckley, Schneider, and Shang 2004;
Loeb, Darling-Hammond, and Luczak, 2005). Consistent with these claims, student achievement
has been shown to be positively associated with district-level capital spending (Crampton 2009;
Jones and Zimmer 2001). The analysis in this paper will shed light on whether this association
reflects a causal relationship.
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National surveys suggest that conditions in Texas school facilities are roughly comparable to those across
the country. A 1999 survey of 903 public schools found that the average age of instructional buildings was 40 years,
with a remaining functional age of only 16 more years. Older schools were more likely to report unsatisfactory
conditions (NCES 2000). A 2005 survey found that 15 percent of schools were overcrowded (NCES 2007). In
comparison, the average age of facilities in Texas in 2006 was 34 years, with a remaining functional age of nine
more years.
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DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Our analysis draws on four sources of data at the student, district, and campus levels,
which are then aggregated to the district-year level for most of the regression discontinuity
analysis. Event- study analysis uses disaggregated student microdata combined with campuslevel information.
Bond election data. From the Texas Bond Review Board, we acquired data on the
election date, bond amount, and result for 2,277 separate school bond propositions put up for a
vote by Texas public school districts from 1997 to 2010.8 We collected vote share data from 812
school districts (98 percent of districts holding elections), along with supporting documentation
via public information requests. Whenever there were multiple propositions considered during
the same academic year, we used the characteristics (size, vote share, result) for the largest
proposition (by bond amount) as our “focal” election for that district in that year.9 In our analysis
window there were 1,737 district-years in which an election was held, so that on average districts
held elections about twice during our study period. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about
the elections during this time period. Voters approved 80 percent of these bond measures, with
an average vote share of 64 percent. The mean (median) bond amount was $11,086 ($7,756) per
student (in 2010 dollars).
District- and campus-level longitudinal data. From the Texas Education Agency’s
Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) data system, we measure the number of campus
types (elementary, middle, secondary, both), number of schools opening/closing by type,
student-teacher ratio by campus type, and average student demographics for 1994 to 2011. We
8

We adopt the convention used by the Texas Education Agency to refer to academic year by the end year.
For instance, 2000 refers to the academic year September 1999 to August 2000.
9
In these cases, there was usually a single large proposition for buildings and renovations and then one or
two smaller propositions for athletic facilities or gymnasiums.
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also construct the share of enrollment in new schools (opened in the past year or four years)
annually. Annual data on expenditures per student at the district-level was obtained from the
Common Core of Data.10
Age and condition of school facilities. To better describe the impact of bond passage on
building infrastructure, we obtained information about the age, time since last renovation, and
room or building condition of nearly all campuses in 1991 and in a subset of districts in 2006.
The 1991 data come from a facilities engineering assessment of all public school buildings
commissioned by the Texas Education Agency. From data on the square footage, overall
condition, year built, and year last renovated for each identifiable room, hallway, and other
spaces at each campus, we construct the space-weighted mean of room condition and building
age for each campus. We have successfully digitized this data for nearly all campuses and
districts, 804 of which held bond elections during our analysis window.11 The 2006 data come
from a voluntary survey conducted by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts; responses
came from 302 districts (228 that held elections), including 3,548 instructional facilities
(accounting for about half of the state’s student population). This survey includes year built, year
last renovated, overall condition “excellent,” “good,” “fair,” “poor,” “needs replacement”),
square footage, number and square footage of portable buildings, and total student capacity at the
campus level. The 1991 and 2006 data were combined with AEIS data on school openings to
calculate the building age and time since last renovation for each campus in each year, which is

10

Campus-level measures of capital investment are not available from any standard sources since capital
spending is budgeted and spent by districts, even if it is targeted at specific campuses.
11
A small number of campuses were not successfully digitized because original data sources were lost or
damaged.
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then aggregated to the district level.12 Information on year built and year last renovated was also
directly used to identify major renovations and campus openings for the event-study analysis.
Student achievement, attendance, migration. Our primary outcomes are standardized
test scores and attendance records from student microdata for all third through eighth graders
tested from 1994 to 2011 and high school exit exam scores for the same period.13 We focus on
reading and mathematics scores for students in grade three to eight and high school exit exam
scores for these two subjects, as these are available for the entire study period. Exit exams are
typically taken in the tenth or eleventh grade. Since the tests are not comparable across grades
within a year and since there were changes in the tests used over time, we standardize raw scores
in the microdata by grade and year. To examine attendance, we calculate the fraction of days
each student is in attendance in each academic year. For our main RD analysis, microdata are
aggregated to district-year means (both overall and for various subgroups) and deciles to assess
how the full distribution of outcomes is altered by bond passage and subsequent capital
investment.14 We also use the micro data to calculate the share of students (second through
twelfth grade) that are new to the district in each year. Finally, the disaggregated student-level
microdata are also used in event-study analysis of campus renovations and school openings.

12

Campus age is available for all years for the 804 digitized districts that held bond elections, but time
since last renovation is only available through 2006, as we do not have information on renovations occurring after
the 2006 survey. Furthermore, we only observe the timing of the most recent major renovation, so renovations are
disproportionately clustered in the years leading up to the 2006 survey.
13
Student-level data come from administrative records of the University of Texas at Dallas’s Texas
Schools Project.
14
To preserve data richness while complying with data confidentiality requirements, the aggregation to
district-level outcomes is done as follows. From the microdata we calculate the mean, standard deviation, and
number of observations for student groups defined by campus × grade (third through eighth or exit) × economic
status (free-lunch eligible, reduced-price lunch eligible, not economically disadvantaged) for each year from 1994 to
2011 whenever this cell contains at least five tested students and a nonzero standard deviation. These cells are then
aggregated to district-level means using the cell size as weights. Since some cells are missing because of small
samples, the district average will reflect the average for nonmissing groups, rather than the population of all students
in the district. We do not obtain the district-level mean, as that would potentially allow us to back out the mean for a
nondisclosed group. District-level deciles combine students from all grades and economic status groups but are only
reported for districts with at least 100 tested students.
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Table 2 summarizes characteristics of districts in the year prior to a bond election,
separately by whether the proposition was successful. Successful elections tend to be in larger
districts that are spending slightly more on capital investment (and have higher rates of school
openings) at baseline than unsuccessful elections. Student achievement is only slightly better at
baseline in districts whose bond elections pass.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We employ two empirical strategies to estimate the effect of school facility investments.
The first is a regression-discontinuity research design based on close school bond elections. The
second is an event study analysis of the impact of school renovation and openings.
Regression Discontinuity with Panel Data
The RD model is based on the observation that even if districts in which a bond measure
passes tend to be different from districts where bond measures fail, these differences likely
shrink as comparisons focus on close elections (Lee 2008). When this condition holds, we can
attribute outcome differences between students who live in districts that narrowly pass and fail to
postelection variation in capital spending.
For an outcome Y (such as student test scores) observed 𝜏 years after a bond election was
held in district j in year t, we estimate models of the form:
(1)

Yj ,t    Pass j ,t  f  j ,t    j ,t  ,

where Passj,t is an indicator for whether the bond measure passed, and 𝑓is a flexible function of
the vote share vj,t, and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡+𝜏 is a residual. The model allows the effect of bond passage at time t to
have different effects on Y depending on the length of time between bond passage and the
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outcome (as captured by the subscript “𝜏” on 𝜃). Following Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein
(2010), we first estimate Equation (1) on a panel data set constructed in the following way. First,
for each district j that has an election in year t, we “stack” all district-year observations for this
district in some window around t. For instance, if we choose a window from t−2 through t+6, a
district holding an election in 2004 will include all observations for the period 2002–2010.
Second, we combine the stacked data sets for each separate election into one large panel data set
covering the entire study period.15
Our preferred estimates are from models that add controls for election and time fixed
effects to Equation (1):
(2) Yj ,t    Pass j ,t  f  j ,t    j ,t  t      j ,t  ,
where 𝛼𝑡+𝜏 and 𝛿𝜏 are calendar and relative year effects, respectively, 𝜇𝑗,𝑡 is a district-election
fixed effect, and 𝜔𝑗,𝑡+𝜏 is an error term. The advantage of this specification relative to Equation
(1) is that the district-election fixed effects improve precision and control for changes in sample
composition when we have an unbalanced panel.16 We also estimate Equation (2) without
controlling for a function of the vote share, which is a standard difference-in-differences
specification. This difference-in- differences model will yield more precise estimates than
models with vote share controls, yet it requires the additional identifying assumption that
changes in unobserved determinants of outcomes are unrelated to bond passage.
Equation (2) will deliver valid estimates of the causal effect of school bond passage if
districts in which a bond measure narrowly fails do not differ systematically from districts where
the bond measures are narrowly approved in ways that are related to student outcomes. We
15
Since multiple observations per district are included, we adjust all standard errors for clustering at the
district level.
16
It is possible to control for these election-specific fixed effects even though vote share does not vary
within an election over time, because the coefficient on bond election passage and the function of the vote share are
allowed to vary with the amount of time since bond passage but are constrained to zero in the preelection period.
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present two pieces of evidence consistent with this condition. First, as shown in Appendix Figure
1, the density of the bond measure vote share is “smooth” at the 50 percent threshold, and a
formal test (McCrary 2008) fails to reject that the density is continuous.17 Second, we find little
evidence of discontinuities in the mean of district-level covariates at the 50 percent cutoff when
estimating Equation (2), using many preelection characteristics as the outcome.18
One complication when implementing the RD model in this case stems from the fact that
districts can (and do) hold elections in multiple years. Many “control” districts (those whose
bond measures did not pass) are eventually “treated.” This implies that the models above identify
an “intention to treat” (ITT) effect that combines both direct effects of the current bond election
and outcome and indirect effects via subsequent election outcomes). In order to uncover the
direct effect of bond passage (and capital investment) holding subsequent election outcomes
constant—i.e., the “treatment on the treated” (TOT)—we follow the “one step” method proposed
by Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010). In this approach, we include indicators for bond
election passage in each prior year, indicators for holding an election in each prior year, a
polynomial function of the vote share in each prior year, district fixed effects, and calendar-year
fixed effects.19





(3) Yj ,t   0  Pass j ,t    Elect j ,t   f  j ,t     j  t  u j ,t .


17

The point estimate of the discontinuity in density from the McCrary test is 0.227, with a standard error of

0.164.
18
The results (Appendix Table 1) reveal that few covariates have discontinuities that are statistically
significant once we control for election fixed effects. The one exception is that districts where the bond election
barely passes appear to have slightly higher rates of English-language learners (ELL) and Hispanic students (and
fewer white students), but given the number of covariates examined it is unsurprising to see some differences
because of chance. Importantly, preelection differences in all our main outcomes are small and insignificant.
19
Vote share is set to zero for observations in which no election was held.
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This model is estimated on a standard district-year panel among districts holding elections,
including all years from 1994 to 2011.20 The coefficients on lagged bond election passage, 𝜃𝜏,
provide an estimate of the causal effect of bond passage holding subsequent election outcomes
constant. In this paper we primarily focus on TOT estimates, though we present ITT estimates in
the appendix.
Event Study Analysis
A key limitation of the RD analysis is that we may not have enough statistical power to
detect effects of policy-relevant size. The reason is that the bond passage treatment is diffuse;
funds raised by a bond may only benefit a small subset of students in a district, who are difficult
to identify given that we do not have campus-level capital investment information. To address
these issues, we use an “event study” framework to estimate the effect of large campus
renovations and new school openings. This approach offers potentially sizable power gains
relative to the district-level RD since it focuses on students actually exposed to capital
investment.21 This approach approximates that used in Nielson and Zimmerman’s (2014)
analysis of school constructions in New Haven, but we use statewide data on a much larger
number of facility investment events.
To quantify the effects of renovations, we estimated models of the following form:
(4) Yigst     p  k  p Dstp   LagYigst   g  t  s  X ist   igst ,
k

20

This TOT estimator could potentially be subject to bias, as it controls for outcomes (bond elections, vote
share, and bond passage) subsequent to a given election. Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) also present an
alternative “recursive” estimator of the TOT effects, which is not subject to this form of bias. In practice, the onestep and recursive estimates are quite similar, though the former is much more precise; thus our focus is on the onestep estimator. Results using the recursive estimator are available from the authors.
21
The power gain afforded by focusing on students actually affected by capital investments comes not only
from improved precision of the estimates, which has to do with the number of renovations or constructions relative
to the number of close bond elections. It also relates to the bond election treatment being diffuse relative to
renovations or constructions, which make effect size much smaller in the RD analysis. We return to this issue later.
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where Yigst is the outcome for student i in grade g attending campus s in year t, and Dstp is a
dummy variable indicating campus s was renovated p years prior to t. The terms 𝛾g, 𝜆𝑡, and 𝜇s are
grade, year, and campus fixed effects, respectively. Student demographic controls are included in
the vector X ist . The parameters 𝜃𝑝 are the coefficients of interest, indicating the change in
outcomes p years after renovation relative to trends at schools that were not renovated during this
time (we normalize to the year of renovation by omitting Dst0 ). Prerenovation differences are
captured by these parameters for p < 0 while post-renovation differences are captured for p > 0.
In order to mitigate sample selection bias, we estimated these models on a sample of
campuses that were open for the full panel and that had renovations during our study period.22
Identifying variation thus comes only from differences in the timing of renovation rather than in
the existence of a renovation project. After making these restrictions, we have a sample of 1,354
renovated schools in 235 districts serving fourth through eighth graders. We also conduct an
analysis on schools where the renovations appear to have generated large changes in school
quality. Specifically, for this analysis we focus on renovations where, before the renovation, the
campus’s average room condition was in the bottom two quintiles of campuses in the 1991
school facility census, but after the renovation, the campus was rated as “good” or “excellent” in
the 2006 survey of school facilities.
School openings are more difficult to analyze, both conceptually and empirically, since
there is not an obvious “pretreatment” group with which to compare students attending the new
school. We modify Equation (4) in two ways to accommodate school openings. First, we match
each new school to the existing school that the majority of students at the new school would have
attended had the new school not opened, based on the empirical feeder patterns that existed prior
22

To identify renovated schools and the timing of renovations, we used information from the 2006 facility
condition survey available for 302 districts, which identifies the date a school was last renovated.
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to the school opening (see Appendix B for details on how these matches were done). The campus
fixed effects 𝜇s in Equation (4) are then replaced with fixed effects for the combination of new
and matched existing school (the “school group”). Second, since only some of the students in the
school group attend the new school, we interact the Dstp dummy variables with the share of
students attending the new school for all p > 0. This specification nests situations where an
existing campus is completely replaced by a new campus, which would be treated exactly like a
major renovation in Equation (4). School opening estimates are relative to the year prior to the
opening. Our sample contains 258 campus openings for which we could identify a suitable
counterfactual school, though some analysis, in order to mitigate selection effects, focuses on a
subset of these where the matched school accounts for a large share of counterfactual enrollment
and for which there was little change in overall enrollment in the school group.
For both the renovation and construction event study analyses, the assumption needed for
the estimates to be interpreted as causal effects is that the unobserved factors that affect student
outcomes cannot be systematically correlated with the timing of school renovations or openings.
This assumption is stronger than what is required for the RD analysis and could be violated if
student outcomes were trending upward or downward leading up to renovations or openings or if
the composition of students changed following the event. We address these possibilities by
controlling for lagged student test scores (a “value added” specification) and by examining
trends leading up to renovations and openings. As we discuss in our results, we see little
evidence of preevent outcome trends, which lends support to the causal interpretation of our
estimates.
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REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY RESULTS
Nature and Timing of Capital Investments
Figure 1 presents graphical evidence that bond passage results in a large, immediate
increase in capital spending. In the year prior to the election (first panel), spending is similar for
districts where bond measures were approved or rejected, but in the year following an election,
capital spending increases more than $2,000 per pupil in districts where the bond barely passed
compared to those in which it barely failed. The spending increase persists though Year Two but
reverses by Year Six.23 The top panel of Table 3 presents ITT estimates of the effect of close
bond passage on annual and cumulative capital outlays, using our baseline specification, which
controls for election fixed effects and a linear function of the vote share (with varying slopes on
each side of the vote share threshold). Bond passage results in doubling ($2,333) of capital
spending per student (in 2010 dollars) in the year following the election, with large and positive
effects in the second year as well. Thereafter, the effects are negative and statistically
insignificant, suggesting that increased capital investments occur shortly after the election. TOT
estimates in Panel B show that bond passage has a positive effect on capital spending through
Year Three and results in an increase in cumulative spending over six years of about $5,000 per
pupil.24
Although the school bonds are explicitly targeted for capital investments, bond passage
could increase spending on other school expenditure categories. However, the estimates in Panel
C and the graphical evidence in Figure 2 provide little indication that bond passage affects
instructional inputs. In the first four years after the election, bond passage has a very small and
23
Figure 1 and subsequent figures use a bandwidth of 5 percentage points and plot a linear prediction
estimated on the underlying election data, not the aggregated bins. Similar figures with a 2.5 percentage point
bandwidth and quadratic prediction are displayed in the appendix.
24
As shown in Appendix Figure A2, districts whose elections are successful are much less likely to hold or
pass an election within four years, but the effect dissipates in later years.

17

statistically insignificant effect on instructional spending per student. We find a small but
statistically significant increase in instructional spending in Years Five and Six, but the
magnitudes—about 3 percent of the sample mean—are very small, and this result is not robust to
alternative specifications (Appendix Table A2).25
School Environments
How bond-funded capital campaigns actually alter the facility environments faced by
students has not been established in prior literature (Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein 2010; Hong
and Zimmer 2014). Table 4 and Figure 3 show that capital campaigns improve the quality of
school buildings partially through the opening of new schools: bond-funded school capital
campaigns increase the likelihood of a district opening at least one campus by 11 percentage
points by Year Two, and they double the share of students attending brand new schools. Despite
these large proportionate increases, the number of students actually exposed to new schools is
small: three years after an election, capital campaigns increase the fraction of students enrolled in
a school opened within the last four years by less than 4 percentage points. This new
construction reduces the enrollment-weighted campus age by 1.4 years within three years of
initiating the capital campaign. Consequently, the change in average building condition predicted
by campus age is positive and small for the third year following the bond election.26 The
evidence is stronger for the claim that capital campaigns increase exposure to renovated schools.

25
Appendix Table A2 shows TOT estimates using linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomials in the vote
share. Because the TOT specification does not lend itself to restricting the running variable bandwidth, we also
show ITT estimates in Appendix Table A4 that use different bandwidths as well as alternative polynomials.
26
To construct a time-varying measure of average building condition, we regress overall building condition
in 2006 (using a five-point scale) on a cubic in campus age, then predict out of sample to all campuses and years for
which campus age is available.
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All estimated effects of capital campaigns on enrollment-weighted average years since a school
was last renovated are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better.27
Further evidence on the impact of capital campaigns on facility conditions comes from a
cross-sectional analysis of the 2006 survey of school conditions. Since the outcomes generated
from the survey are only observed in a single year, we estimate standard cross-sectional RD
models where the running variable is the vote share in the first bond election held by a district
between 1997 and the time of the survey.28 Results are depicted in Figure 4 (model estimates are
reported in Appendix Table A7). One limitation of this analysis is that we only have the survey
data for one year and 302 districts (204 of which held bond elections), limiting statistical power.
As seen in the top row of Figure 4, bond passage causes modest increases in the likelihood that
school facilities are in at least fair or at least good condition, although the estimates are not
statistically different from zero for districts overall.29 However, capital campaigns are associated
with closing gaps in school facility conditions between older and newer buildings (bottom row):
bond passage increases the likelihood that a school is in at least fair or at least good condition
among old schools by about 15 to 22 percentage points (p-value 0.045, 0.018). Capital

27

Results on campus renovations at long lags should be interpreted cautiously, as estimates are based on a
small number of elections (126 elections with 17 failures after six years vs. 263 elections with 54 failures after two
years). In addition to our baseline specification (which includes election fixed effects and controls for a two-part
linear function of the vote share), we also estimated models using a variety of alternative specifications to assess the
robustness of the effects on school conditions. Appendix Tables A2 and A4 show TOT estimates using linear,
quadratic, and cubic polynomials in the vote share and ITT estimates using various bandwidths. Our estimated
effects on educational inputs are quite robust across these different specifications, both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
28
To parallel our district-level panel analysis, we weight each campus observation by the inverse of the
total number of schools in a district, so that each district receives equal weight. We also estimate a model that
includes an interaction between Passj and campus age at baseline and also district fixed effects. This specification
assesses whether bond passage differentially affects schools of different ages in the same district.
29
District administrators were asked to rate the physical condition of all their school buildings. “Fair”
condition is defined as “Major repairs needed, but the building’s condition does not impair student learning or
staff/student safety.” “Good” is defined as “Some repairs may be beneficial, but the facility is structurally and
educationally sound.” Appendix Figure A7 plots the fraction of the buildings that are in “fair” and “good” condition
as a function of facility age. General building conditions deteriorate rapidly as buildings become more than about
20 or 25 years old, though older buildings are in better condition if an earlier bond election was successful.
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campaigns also reduce the effective age of old school facilities by roughly seven years, and this
effect is statistically significant.30
In sum, these results suggest that capital campaigns increase student exposure to
renovated schools and improve the quality of building conditions in older schools. The results
also suggest that campaigns increase school openings considerably (from a low baseline), but
that relatively few students are affected by such changes. We find that school opening lags
behind investment by about one year, and that the largest rates of opening occur in Years Two
and Three after a successful election. The results in this section provide some of the first
evidence demonstrating that capital campaigns funded by school bonds lead to tangible
improvements in school facilities.
Although the capital campaigns we study appear to confer only modest improvements to
facilities, they may yet influence student environments through attracting and retaining highquality teachers to a local district (Buckley, Schneider, and Shang 2005). In the final row of
Table 4, we find that capital campaigns have minimal impact on the fraction of teachers that
leave schools (either to teach at another school in the district, to move to another district, or to
leave the profession). Thus, the only modest impact on school conditions for the typical student
does not translate to measureable effects on teacher retention.
Student Achievement
Table 5 shows TOT estimates of the impact of bond passage on test scores and
attendance. Overall, we find little evidence that bond passage generates improvements in student

30
These patterns are quite robust to various polynomials in vote share and the inclusion of district fixed
effects. Results are similar for elementary, middle, and high school separately (though less precise). Appendix
Figure A8 exploits the fact that campuses are observed in 2006, with different lags since the first bond election to
document that the improvement in overall building conditions, effective building age, portable use, and several
measures of crowding seen among older campuses all show the most improvement four to five years after a
successful election.
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achievement or attendance, a conclusion that is echoed in the graphical evidence (Figure 5). For
grades three through eight, the point estimates are initially close to zero and inconsistent in sign.
By Year Six, the estimates are positive but statistically insignificant. The magnitude of the
estimates is 0.016 and 0.030 standard deviations for reading and math, respectively, and we can
rule out effects larger than 0.06 for reading and 0.08 for math. This finding is shown more
clearly in Figure 6, which plots coefficients and confidence intervals for our preferred RD
specification along with a difference-in-differences model that does not control for vote share.
Difference-in-differences point estimates are very similar to those from the RD but are precise
enough to rule out test score effects greater than 0.03 and 0.05 standard deviations for reading
and math, respectively. Thus, we are able to rule out the imprecise point estimates found by
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein, of a roughly 0.067 and 0.077 student-level standard deviation
improvement for third grade reading and math scores from capital investments of comparable
magnitude. The estimated impacts on exit exam scores and overall attendance rates are very
close to zero and inconsistent in sign, both across years and between math and reading. As
shown in Appendix Table A3, across a variety of different specifications of the vote share
function, we find very little evidence of impacts of bond passage on student performance.
To address the possibility that changes in the student population offset impacts of capital
spending on student achievement, Panel E of Table 5 reports estimates on the overall migration
rate of students into the district. The point estimates are small, but positive, for the first four
years, then negative thereafter. Though the point estimate in Year Two is marginally statistically
significant, this result is not persistent and generally not robust to alternative specifications (not
reported).
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Although these results provide little indication that school bond passage leads to
appreciable impacts on overall student outcomes, an important question is whether bond passage
reduces achievement gaps, as might be the case if the resulting investments disproportionately
benefit students from disadvantaged backgrounds within districts. We investigate this issue by
estimating effects on the gap between the tenth and ninetieth percentile of the individual test
score and attendance distributions within districts. We find no evidence that bond passage
narrows test score gaps; the precision of the estimates permits us to rule out very small effects on
the test score distribution. For attendance, the estimates suggest bond passage might reduce
disparities in attendance rates, but the estimates imply very small practical effects. Using
alternative bandwidths, we also assessed the robustness of these findings by examining the
estimates across a variety of specifications for the vote share polynomial as well as the ITT.31
These results (reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A5) are consistent with the main substantive
message in Table 5 that there is little indication that bond passage narrows test score gaps.
Another way of investigating whether capital campaigns reduce disparities is to see if the
impacts vary by student socioeconomic status. Table 6 presents TOT estimates for test scores
separately for students that receive free lunch and those that are not economically
disadvantaged.32 For the non–free lunch recipients, the estimates are all very close to zero, and
we can rule out effects larger than 0.06 standard deviations. For the free lunch sample, however,
the estimates tend to be positive, and by Year Six they are statistically significant for both math

31

The TOT specification does not lend itself to restricting the running variable bandwidth, so we also show
ITT estimates with various bandwidths as well as alternative polynomials. As explained in our section on methods,
the TOT estimates use the running variables from multiple elections for the same district in a single regression
model on panel data. Restricting the vote share bandwidth would sharply reduce the number of districts we could
use in the sample if the restriction applied to all the possible elections that contribute a vote share to a particular
regression. It would also bias the sample to districts that hold relatively few elections.
32
The smaller groups of students who received reduced price lunch (but not free) represent an intermediate
category and were excluded from this discussion, though they are included when examining district-level mean
outcomes.
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and reading. Nonetheless, a careful examination of this finding under alternative specifications
leads us to discount this result somewhat, as the magnitude and significance are sensitive to
specification. In Appendix Table A3, we see that the point estimates tend to reduce with more
flexible polynomials in vote share and the difference-in-differences estimates are much smaller
and insignificant (reading) or only marginally significant (math) compared to our baseline RD
estimates. Moreover, once the bandwidth is limited to elections where the vote share was within
25 percentage points of passage, the ITT point estimates are close to zero and much smaller than
the ITT estimates that use the full range of vote shares and a linear function of the vote share
(Appendix Table A6).33
Dosage and Heterogeneity by District Characteristics
Though our main results find no measureable effect of bond-funded capital campaigns
overall, it is possible that campaigns with large impacts on conditions could have bigger effects.
The median bond proposed to voters in our study period was for $7,756 per student. While this
represents a large increase over baseline levels of spending, it is an order of magnitude smaller
than what was observed in the large-scale school construction program undertaken in New
Haven.34 To test for dosage effects, we look at differences by several baseline (preelection)
characteristics likely to be associated with the treatment intensity. We implement this by
interacting bond passage in Equation (3) with bond amount and indicators for the district having
an above-median share of students economically disadvantaged (in 1997), above-median
enrollment-weighted campus age (in 1997), and below-median building condition (in 1991).
Though districts proposing larger bonds and with older and poor-quality buildings do indeed
33
In results available from the authors, we also find that economically disadvantaged students do not
experience larger-than-average improvements in campus conditions following bond passage, as measured by
average campus age and the share of students enrolled in new schools.
34
In fact, the New Haven campaign would be in the ninety-ninth percentile of all bond electrions proposed
by school districts in Texas between 1997 and 2010.
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make larger capital investments following bond passage, the differences are not very large, and
we detect no differences in test score effects by these baseline characteristics. In fact, the sixyear test score point estimate is smaller for districts with greater needs for capital investment.
While suggestive of minimal effect of capital campaigns on student achievement, this dosage
analysis is fairly underpowered.35

EVENT-STUDY RESULTS
A limitation of district-level RD models is that we cannot identify which students benefit
from the investments generated by bond passage. Thus bond passage may be too diffuse a
treatment to detect small to moderate effects on district-level outcomes. To address this issue, we
estimate the effect of attending schools that have been renovated or newly opened using an
event-study model with student-level microdata.
Figure 7 depicts our main event study estimates for school renovations. These models
include campus fixed effects, year-grade fixed effects, and control for lagged test scores. The
results provide no indication of meaningful effects on test scores, as all of the post-intervention
estimates are close to zero and precisely estimated. In particular, we can rule out positive effects
larger than about 0.013 for math and 0.016 for reading for the first four years following the
renovation. The bottom row of Figure 7 isolates renovations likely to be associated with large
facility condition improvements by limiting the sample to schools that were in poor condition in
1991 (measured by being in the bottom two quintiles of average room condition) but that were in

35
Results from these models are reported in Appendix Table A8. Some of the imprecision of dosage effect
estimates stems from the fact that bond-funded capital campaigns do not appear to be well-targeted at the districts
with the greatest needs. Large campaigns are proposed by wealthier districts that have fewer poor students, smaller
class sizes, and are already spending more on instruction and capital investments (Appendix Table A9). Districts
with older school buildings do propose larger bond amounts, though this relationship is economically small.
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good or excellent condition by 2006. Again, we find no indication that these renovations lead to
improved student achievement in math or reading. Here, the flat preexisting trend continues after
the renovation, with the point estimates neither systematically above nor below zero. Results
focusing only on schools that were in the bottom quintile of room condition in 1991 (not
reported) are very similar. Table 7 presents these estimates and also includes a specification that
does not control for lagged test scores. Importantly, controlling for lagged test scores does not
meaningfully effect estimated point estimates (though it does improve precision considerably). This
suggests little change in the composition of students following renovations, lending credibility to the
key assumption that unobservable student attributes did not change following large school
renovations.

Table 8 presents event-study estimates of the effect of school openings. We find some
suggestive evidence that campus openings are associated with test score improvements, though
the estimates are not robust to various sample restrictions and differ between math and reading.
In the full sample, math scores begin to improve two years after a new campus opens, increasing
by 0.10 of a standard deviation after more than six years. However, focusing on school groups
whose total enrollment did not change by more than 25 percent (column 2) and those with a
clearly identifiable counterfactual school (column 3) alters or eliminates these patterns. Reading
test scores follow a similar pattern, though point estimates are much smaller in magnitude. Also,
it is worth noting that point estimates without controls for lagged test scores are twice as large
(not reported), suggesting advantaged changes in student composition following campus
openings. Given the lack of robustness, differences between math and reading, and changes in
observed student composition (as measured by lagged test scores), we put less confidence in our
estimates of campus openings than for major renovations.
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In summary, we find no evidence that student outcomes improve following large school
renovations, and we can rule out very small achievement effects. This is true even when focusing
on renovations that were likely to have caused large improvements in the physical condition of
the school. Estimates for school openings are less robust and more subject to sample selection
bias, leaving open the possibility that new school openings could improve student achievement.
These results suggest that the lack of effects of bond passage on student test scores may reflect
school facility investments having little effect on student outcomes, at least in the context of our
sample and time period, rather than an artifact of an overly diffuse treatment.

EFFECT SIZE AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS
In order to interpret the magnitudes of the achievement effects our analysis rules out, we
compare our estimates to those from increases in instructional spending of a similar amount.
Given the large expenditures districts make on school facility improvements, a crucial issue for
economic policy is the effectiveness of these investments relative to other uses, which we
address in this section. The discussion below misses any benefits of facility spending that are
not reflected in improved student achievement. However, given the policy significance of student
achievement (e.g., for school accountability programs), we believe these back-of-the-envelope
calculations can provide a useful framework for thinking about the comparative effectiveness of
various educational investments.
As a starting point, an estimate of the impact of instructional spending on achievement
can be obtained from results for the Project STAR class size reduction experiment. Project
STAR increased contemporaneous student achievement by about 0.20 standard deviations for a
50 percent increase in instructional spending (Chetty et al. 2011, Krueger 1999; Schanzenbach
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2006). Mean annual per- pupil instructional spending and the capital expenditures resulting from
school bond passage are roughly the same (about $5,000), implying that a bond-funded capital
campaign is comparable to about a 100 percent increase in instructional spending.36 Assuming
the effect of class size is linear, the average school bond could fund a year of class size reduction
that would generate improvements equal to 0.40 of a standard deviation. Our RD analysis can
rule out such large effects, which suggests that spending on school facilities improves
contemporaneous student achievement by less than increasing instructional spending by the same
amount. But how much additional instructional spending would be required to generate the
improvements in student achievement implied by the smallest effect sizes ruled out by our
confidence intervals? From Figure 6, the upper bound of the confidence interval of the impact of
bond passage six years later is about 0.06 for reading and 0.08 for math. These effect sizes are
about 15 and 20 percent, respectively, of the achievement gain (0.40) that would be generated by
class size reductions that cost the same as the typical capital campaign in Texas. Difference-indifference estimates (i.e., from models with no vote share controls) imply an even smaller range,
7.5 to 12.5 percent.
Event study analysis of renovations allows us to rule out smaller effects both because the
scale of investment is larger than for district-level bond passage and because point estimates are
more precise.37 A recent compilation of costs for all Texas school construction projects estimates
the typical elementary and middle school project costs about $18,000 per student (TCPA
2014).38 Again, assuming linearity of treatment effects, an instructional spending increase of this

36

While the capital spending is an investment that pays out over a number of years and the capital
depreciates over time, the first cohort exposed to the capital spending benefits by an amount that does not depend on
the rate of depreciation.
37
We do not explicitly address the effects of new school openings in this calculation, as the estimates and
implied confidence regions were inconsistent and generally not more informative than our RD estimates.
38
According to the report, the average elementary school construction project cost $17,461 (76 percent of
projects) and the average middle school project cost $21,473 (24 percent of projects). These figures include both
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magnitude would lead to student achievement gains of 1.44 standard deviations. From Figure 7,
we can rule out impacts of school renovations several years after the renovation of about 0.02 of
a standard deviation, or about 1.4 percent of the achievement gains associated with an increase in
instructional spending of comparable cost. Thus, a dollar spent on school renovations has a
smaller impact on contemporaneous student achievement than a $0.014 investment in class size
reduction.
From the perspective of contemporaneous achievement effects, capital spending has a
much smaller impact than spending on instruction. However, several factors make capital
spending more cost-effective than the above calculations imply. Most importantly, capital
spending is durable. A newly constructed school could continue to benefit students well after the
initial investment, whereas smaller classes for one cohort should not benefit future cohorts. Thus,
capital spending could still be cost-effective even with very small treatment effects. The upper
limit of our confidence interval for the effects of renovations implies that capital spending would
need to last for more than 70 years before it would be as cost-effective as class size reduction at
improving student achievement.39 The condition of campuses in our study appears to deteriorate
much more rapidly than this. Capital investment may also be easier to scale up than class-size
reduction (see the discussion in Schanzenbach 2006), as it does not require the hiring of
additional teachers, though we do not have a way to quantify how this would alter our
calculations.

brand new schools and large renovations or expansions to existing schools, but we are not able to distinguish
between them. Anecdotally, a large fraction of these are for existing campuses and thus provide a reasonable
approximation for the major renovations contained in our event study analysis. National estimates for the
construction costs for new elementary and middle schools were $25,500 and $29,959 per student, respectively, in
2010 (National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities 2015).
39
Since a typical renovation has (at most) an effect on achievement that is 1.4 percent of what would result
from an equally costly class size reduction program, it would need to benefit 71 cohorts (71 = 100/1.4) to have the
same impact on achievement minus years per dollar spent.
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CONCLUSION
School facility spending represents one of the largest educational investments in the
United States, with state and local governments spending more than $65 billion a year on these
expenditures. Despite the magnitude and ubiquity of this investment, we know surprisingly little
about how this money is spent, how it is allocated within and across districts, and its impact on
student outcomes. In the current era of lean public budgets, understanding the answers to these
questions has considerable significance for economic policy.
This paper provides such empirical evidence. Using statewide administrative data from
the state of Texas to estimate both RD models based on close school bond elections and event
study models of school renovations, we find little indication that spending on school facilities
generates improvements in student achievement. School bond passage is associated with
substantial increases in capital expenditure per student and real improvements in educational
facilities, though the number of students materially affected by the typical project is low. The
money goes towards the opening of new campuses quickly (within 2 to 3 years of bond passage)
and renovating older ones with no impact on operating expenditures. Our RD estimates allow us
to rule out effects of school facility investments on contemporaneous achievement larger than 15
to 20 percent of the impact of a comparable increase in instructional spending, while differencein-differences and event study estimates allow us to rule out much smaller achievement effects
(12.5 and 1.4 percent of effects from class size reductions of similar cost, respectively). The
confidence intervals for our estimates also exclude the point estimates found in two prior studies
that use similar research designs—namely, the district-level RD approach of Cellini, Ferreira,
and Rothstein (2010) and the campus-level event-study approach of Nielson and Zimmerman
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(2014), though the latter study investments targeting schools in much worse condition than the
more typical investment we consider.40
We conclude that typical recent capital investments made and financed by local school
districts themselves did not generate appreciable improvements in student achievement.
Although there may be other benefits to improving school facilities such as improving student
health, teacher morale, or neighborhood amenities, these investments are unlikely to generate
significant achievement gains or narrow achievement gaps. Neighborhood residents do appear to
value marginal school investments (CFR, 2010), but it appears that improved test scores are not
the main channel. Uncovering these additional benefits and determining whether alternativefunding mechanisms such as direct federal and state investment would have a different impact
are both important area of future inquiry.

40

Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) study bond elections that are of similar magnitude as those in our
study, so our estimates are directly comparable to theirs. Our baseline RD 95 percent CI reported in Figure 6
excludes their point estimate for reading but not math, but our difference-in differences 95 percent CI excludes their
estimates for both subjects. Neilson and Zimmerman (2014) study an intervention that is nearly four times larger
than the typical renovation in Texas. Multiplying the upper bound of our 95 percent CI from the top panel of Figure
7 by four excludes the 0.11–0.12 standard deviation increase they observe for reading, but not the 0.04–0.05
standard deviation increase they observe for math.
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Figure 1 Level and Change in Capital Spending by Vote Share, before and after Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot average district capital spending (in $000s) or change in average district capital spending (relative to years
prior to election), separately by the vote share in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 5-point bins of vote share.
Includes data for 1,737 elections and 812 districts.
SOURCE: Spending data is from the NCES Common Core.
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Figure 2 Instructional Spending by Vote Share, before and after Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot average district instructional spending or change in average district instructional spending (relative to years
prior to election), separately by the vote share in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 5-point bins of vote share.
Includes data for 1,737 elections and 812 districts.
SOURCE: Spending data is from the NCES Common Core.
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Figure 3 Capital Inputs by Vote Share, Change since Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot change in average district building conditions (relative to two years prior to election), separately by the vote
share in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 5-point bins of vote share. Top row includes data for 1,737 elections
and 812 districts. Bottom row includes data for 804 districts and 228 districts (465 elections) for campus age and years since
renovation, respectively.
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Figure 4 Building Condition by Vote Share

NOTE: Graphs plot fraction of district buildings in fair or good condition, separately by the vote share in favor of bond passage
for first election held between 1997 and 2006. Elections were grouped in 5-point bins of vote share. Campus-level observations
were weighted inversely by enrollment so that each district is given equal weight. Includes data for 204 districts.
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Figure 5 Achievement Test Scores by Vote Share, Change since Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot change in average district test scores (relative to the two years prior to election), separately by the vote share
in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 5-point bins of vote share. Includes data for 1,737 elections and 812
districts.
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Figure 6 Effect of Bond Passage on Student Achievement, RD vs. Difference in Differences Estimates

NOTE: Graphs depict coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) for main achievement test results. The sample includes yearly
panel data from 1994 to 2011 for all 812 districts that held bond elections. RD model includes district fixed effects, year fixed
effects, indicators for bond passage, holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in
the current year and each previous year. The figure reports the bond passage indicators for each lag. Difference-in differences
model omits vote share controls. Estimates for lags greater than six are not displayed.
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Figure 7 Event-Study Estimates of Effect of Campus Renovations

NOTE: Graphs plot coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) on dummies for years prior and after a major campus
renovation, estimate from Equation (4). All models include campus fixed effects, lagged test scores, and year X grade fixed
effects. Panels C and D additionally control for student sex, race, and free lunch status. Sample includes all test score
observations from 1995 to 2006 in districts that participated in the 2006 facilities survey. Sample is further restricted to
campuses that held a renovation and is open in all years from 1994 to 2006, and to individuals for whom prior year test score is
available. Final row includes campuses that were in the bottom 40% of average room condition in 1991 but were rated as having
a “good” or “excellent” overall building condition in 2006. Sample sizes are 3.4 million student-years (1,354 campuses) for top
row and 713,000 student-years (256 campuses) for bottom row. Standard errors clustered by campus.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Capital Bond Elections
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Table 2 Summary Statistics of District Characteristics in Year Prior to Election

NOTE: Most variables are defined for the full sample of 1,737 unique elections. Enrollment-weighted
average building age (years since renovation) are only available for 530 (227) districts and 1,132 (464)
elections.
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Table 3 Effect of Bond Passage on Educational Inputs (Two-part linear specification with election or district fixed effects.)

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. For Panel A (ITT), the sample includes all bond
elections and all outcome measures from years -2 to +10 relative to each election. This specification includes fixed effects for each election, a linear function of the vote share with
different slopes for passing and nonpassing bonds, relative year fixed effects, academic year fixed effects, and interactions between bond passage and relative year fixed effects
(for relative years 1 to 10). The table reports these passage X relative year interactions. For Panels B –C, the sample includes yearly panel data from 1994 to 2011 for all 812
districts that held bond elections. Model includes indicators for bond passage, holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in the
current year and each previous year up to 10. The table reports the bond passage indicators for each lag. Estimates for current period and lags greater than 6 are not displayed.
Reported mean is for the year prior to the election. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level;
*** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4 Effect of Bond Passage on Capital Inputs and Teacher Mobility (TOT, Two-part linear specification with election or district fixed effects.)

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The sample includes yearly panel data from 1994 to
2011 for all 812 districts that held bond elections. Sample for 4th and 6th rows restricted to 805 districts and 5th row restricted to 228 districts for which campus age was
constructed. Model includes indicators for bond passage, holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in the current year and each
previous year up to 10. The table reports the bond passage indicators for each lag. Estimates for current period and lags greater than 6 are not displayed. Reported mean is for the
year prior to the election. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.
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Table 5 Effect of Bond Passage on District-Wide Student Outcomes
(TOT, Two-part linear specification with district fixed effects.)

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The
sample incudes yearly panel data from 1994 to 2011 for all 812 districts that held bond elections. Model includes indicators for
bond passage, holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in the current year and
each previous year up to 10. The table reports the bond passage indicators for each lag. Estimates for current period and lags
greater than 6 are not displayed. Reported mean is for the year prior to the election. District mean test scores were calculated by
aggregating campus-economic-grade group means (available whenever cell size is at least 5 students) to the district level. Thus,
groups with fewer than 5 students in the campus grade are excluded from calculation of overall averages. District years with
fewer than 100 students are excluded from models examining 90-10 differences. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 6 Socioeconomic Heterogeneity in Effect of Bond Passage
(TOT, Two-part linear specification with district fixed effects.)

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The
sample includes yearly panel data from 1994 to 2011 for all 812 districts that held bond elections. Model includes indicators for
bond passage, holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in the current year and
each previous year up to 10. The table reports the bond passage indicators for each lag. Estimates for current period and lags
greater than 6 are not displayed. Reported mean is for the year prior to the election. Group mean test scores were calculated by
aggregating campus-economic-grade group means (available whenever cell size is at least 5 students) to the group x district level.
Thus, groups with fewer than 5 students in the campus grade are excluded from calculation of overall averages. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at
the 0.01 level.
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Table 7 Event-study Estimates of Effects of Campus Renovations

NOTE: All specifications also include campus fixed effects. Sample includes all test score observations from 1995 to 2006 in
campuses contained in the 2006 facilities survey, held a renovation and is open in all years from 1994 to 2006, and to individuals
for whom prior year test score is available. Specifications (3) and (6) include campuses that were in the bottom 40% of average
room condition in 1991 but were rated as having a “good” or “excellent” overall building condition in 2006. Standard errors
clustered by campus. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.
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Table 8 Event-study Estimates of Effects of Campus Openings

NOTE: All specifications also include school-group fixed effects. Sample includes all test score observations from
1996 to 2006 in newly opened campuses and matched counterfactual schools with consistent information on opening
date between 2006 survey and AEIS data and for which counterfactual school was identifiable. Sample further
restricted to individuals for whom prior year test score is available. Specifications (2) and (5) isolate school openings
in which the total 4th – 8th grade enrollment in the school group does not change by more than 25%. Specifications (3)
and (6) isolate school openings in which at least 75% of students at the newly opened school are predicted to have gone
to the matched counterfactual school. Standard errors clustered by school group. Significance: * significant at the
0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES
Appendix Figure A1 Histogram of Vote Shares

NOTE: Graphs frequency of election, where elections are grouped in 2.5-point bins of vote share. Includes data for 1,737
elections and 812 districts.
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Appendix Figure A2 Effect of Bond Passage on Likelihood of Holding or Passing Subsequent Election

NOTE: Graphs plot regression discontinuity point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for effect of bond passage on
indicator for holding (passing) another bond election 1 through 10 years following bond passage. Specification pools
observations 2 years before through 10 years after each bond election and includes fixed effects for each separate election and a
linear function of the bond measure vote share, as described in the methods section and Equation (2). Results omitting election
fixed effects are indistinguishable. Observation in year of election is omitted. Markers indicate significantly different from zero
at the 0.10 level (*); 0.05 level (**); and 0.01 level (***).
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Appendix Figure A3 Capital Spending by Vote Share, before and after Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot average district capital spending (in $000s) or change in average district capital spending (relative to years
prior to election), separately by the vote share in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 2.5-point bins of vote share.
Includes data for 1,737 elections and 812 districts. Spending data is from the NCES Common Core.
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Appendix Figure A4 Instructional Spending by Vote Share, before and after Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot average district instructional spending or change in average district instructional spending (relative to years
prior to election), separately by the vote share in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 2.5-point bins of vote share.
Includes data for 1,737 elections and 812 districts. Spending data is from the NCES Common Core.
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Appendix Figure A5 Capital Inputs by Vote Share, Change since Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot change in average district building conditions (relative to two years prior to election), separately by the vote
share in favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 2.5-point bins of vote share. Top row includes data for 1,737
elections and 812 districts. Bottom row includes data for 804 districts and 228 districts (465 elections) for campus age and years
since renovation, respectively.

54

Appendix Figure A6 Change in Test Scores by Vote Share, Change since Bond Election

NOTE: Graphs plot change in average district test scores (relative to two years prior to election), separately by the vote share in
favor of bond passage. Elections were grouped in 5-point bins of vote share. Includes data for 1,737 elections and 812 districts.

55

Appendix Figure A7 Overall Facility Condition, by Age of Building and Earlier Election Outcome

NOTE: Graphs plot lowest estimates of the relationship between building condition and facility age. Dashed lines separate
relationship by whether the earlier school bond passed or failed. Includes 204 unique districts, 573 unique bond elections, and
2,895 unique campuses.
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Appendix Figure A8 Timing of Facility Improvements Following Bond Passage

NOTE: Graphs plot regression discontinuity point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for effect of bond passage on four
measures of building condition 1 through 9 years following bond passage. Effect is permitted to vary between old campuses (at
least 25 years old at time of election) and newer campuses. Time since election is grouped into 2-year bins. Confidence interval
is displayed for old campuses only. Specification includes indicators for time since election (grouped into 2-year bins), bond
passage and old campus interacted with these indicators separately, the interaction between passage, old, and time indicators, and
a linear function of the vote share. Graphs plot the main passage effects and the old campus interactions. Outcomes are all
measured in 2006, though elections are held in different years enabling the estimation of time-varying treatment effects. Includes
204 unique districts, 573 unique bond elections, and 2,895 unique campuses.
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Appendix Table A1 Covariate Balance Prior to Election

NOTE: Each cell represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes the year prior to election. The sample in column 1 includes all bond
elections and outcome measures in the year prior to the election. This specification includes bond passage, academic year fixed effects, and bond election vote share (linearly with
different slopes on each side of the passing threshold). The table reports the coefficient on bond passage. The sample in column 2 includes observations for years -2 to +6 relative
to each election. Since some districts hold multiple elections in quick succession, some outcomes appear in the pooled sample multiple times for different relative years. This
specification includes relative year fixed effects, academic year fixed effects, bond election vote share (linearly with different slopes on each side of the passing threshold), and
interactions between bond passage and relative year fixed effects (for relative years -1 to +6). The table reports the coefficient on passage interacted with the indicator for the year
prior to an election (relative year = -1). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; ***
significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Table A2 Effect of Bond Passage on Educational Inputs—Robustness (TOT, Two-part linear specification with district fixed effects.)

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The sample includes yearly panel data from 1994 to
2011 for all 812 districts that held bond elections. Sample for panel F restricted to 228 districts for which renovation data available. Model includes indicators for bond passage,
holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in the current year and previous year up to 10. The table reports the bond passage
indicators for each lag. Estimates for current period and lags greater than 6 are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance: * significant at the
0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Table A3 Effect of Bond Passage on Student Achievement—Robustness
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Appendix Table A4 Effect of Bond Passage on Educational Inputs—ITT and Robustness

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The
sample includes all bond elections and all outcome measures from years -2 to +10 relative to each election in which the vote
share falls within the bandwidth. Since some districts hold multiple elections in quick succession, some outcomes appear in the
sample multiple times for different relative years. All specifications include fixed effects for each election, relative year fixed
effects, academic year fixed effects, and interactions between bond passage and relative year fixed effects (for relative years 1 to
10). The table reports these passage X relative year interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance:
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Table A5 Effect of Bond Passage on Test Scores—ITT and Robustness

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The
sample includes all bond elections and all outcome measures from years -2 to +10 relative to each election in which the vote
share falls within the bandwidth. Since some districts hold multiple elections in quick succession, some outcomes appear in the
sample multiple times for different relative years. All specifications include fixed effects for each election, relative year fixed
effects, academic year fixed effects, and interactions between bond passage and relative year fixed effects (for relative years 1 to
10). The table reports these passage X relative year interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance:
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Table A6 Effect of Bond Passage on Test Scores—ITT and Robustness for Economically
Disadvantaged Students

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The
sample includes all bond elections and all outcome measures from years -2 to +10 relative to each election in which the vote
share falls within the bandwidth. Since some districts hold multiple elections in quick succession, some outcomes appear in the
sample multiple times for different relative years. All specifications include fixed effects for each election, relative year fixed
effects, academic year fixed effects, and interactions between bond passage and relative year fixed effects (for relative years 1 to
10). The table reports these passage X relative year interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance:
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.

63

Appendix Table A7 Effect of Bond Passage on Facility Condition, by Age of Facility

NOTE: “Old” is an indicator for whether the facility is 25 years or older. Bond passage and vote share from the first election held prior to 2006 are used for school districts that
held multiple bond elections in our analysis window. Standard errors are clustered at the school district level. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the total number of
schools in the district, so that each district receives a weight of 1 in the regression. Most regressions include data from 204 unique school districts. Significance: * significant at
the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Table A8 Effect of Bond Passage on Educational Inputs and Test Scores, Heterogeneity by District and Bond Characteristics (TOT, Two-part
linear specification with district fixed effects.)

NOTE: Each row represents a separate specification and reports effects of bond measure passage on outcomes t years later. The sample includes panel data from 1994 to 2011 for
all 812 districts that held bond elections. Sample for panels C and D restricted to 805 districts for which baseline campus age and condition is available. Model includes indicators
for bond passage, holding election, and vote share (with different slopes for passing and nonpassing bond) in the current year and each previous year up to 10. Model also includes
interaction between bond passage (in current and each previous year) and the baseline characteristic reported (e.g., bond amount, district with campus worse than median, etc.).
The table reports the implied (bond passage) + (characteristic) X (bond passage) coefficient for each characteristic group and for each lag. Estimates for current period and lags
greater than 6 are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at
the 0.01 level.
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Appendix Table A9 Baseline District Correlates of School Bond Size

NOTE: Sample in specifications (2) and (3) includes all bond elections held by districts for which average campus age in year of
election was available, which is 805 districts. District characteristics are averaged in the 2 years prior and year of election.
Standard errors are clustered at the school district level. Significance: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05
level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF SCHOOL OPENING EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS
To identify school openings, we first restrict our sample of campuses to those contained in the
2006 Facilities Survey (approximately 300 different districts) and also to the years 1996 to 2006.
Since schools may change identification numbers for various reasons, we identify “clean” school
openings where the year the facility was built according to the 2006 survey is within two years of
the first year the campus ID appears in the AEIS data. This resulted in 380 campuses opened
between 1996 and 2006 with third–eighth graders. Fifty percent of campuses with new campus
ID numbers were deemed to be “clean” openings, representing more than 70 percent of
enrollment in schools with new campus ID numbers.
Identifying Counterfactual Schools
The event study analysis of school openings is complicated by the fact that the newlyconstructed schools by definition have no preconstruction data. Our solution to this problem is to
use data on feeder patterns to identify a “counterfactual school” that students would have
attended had the newly built school not been built. The basic idea is to see which feeder schools
contribute enrollment to the newly built school in the first year it opens, and then use data from
the year(s) before the construction to see where students in the feeder schools attended before the
newly built school was constructed.
To see how we implemented this approach, we began by identifying the F schools that students
attending a school that opened in year t attended in year t−1. We then computed the share of
students in the new school who came from each feeder school i, denoted by ai. Next, we
examined the transition patterns between the newly built school’s feeder-schools and existing
schools between t−2 and t−1 (i.e., prior to the new school opening). We chose the counterfactual
school from the set of schools receiving students in t−1 who attended the newly built school’s
feeder schools in t−2. First, we calculated the share of students in t−1 who attended feeder
school i in t−2 that attended receiving school j in t−1 (denoted by  ij ). Using these shares, we
computed w j  i  ij ai , which is the share of students who attended the feeder schools that
contribute to the newly built school’s enrollment in year t and who attend receiving school j in
t−1. We selected the receiving school with the largest value of wj to be the newly built school’s
counterfactual school. After identifying the matched schools, we formed the grouping between
the new and matched existing school. In the event study models for school openings, we control
for school-group fixed effects as explained in the main text.
F

In practice, we could not identify suitable counterfactual matches for all newly opened schools.
One reason is because a new school’s best match was not unique, meaning that there was another
new school that shared the same counterfactual school. Another reason was because a school’s
best match was itself a school that opened during our study period. Furthermore, some opened
campuses or matched counterfactual schools were dropped because their students were missing
prior-year test scores. After excluding these problematic cases, we were left with 258 school
openings.
Even for new schools for which we found a match, the best match may not be very good if feeder
patterns are very diffuse. We used two variables to assess the quality of a match. The first is the
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percentage change in the total sample size in the school group in the year the school opened. If
this change is large, it would suggest that there could be large compositional changes in the
school group in the year before the opening, when the school group consisted only of the
counterfactual match school, and the year of the opening. The second is the value of wj for the
matched school. Low values of wj suggest that, had the new school not been built, the students
attending the new school would likely have been spread evenly across a number of existing
schools rather than being concentrated in one existing school. In these cases, there is less reason
to think that the preopening achievement patterns in the school group are informative about the
preopening achievement patterns of students who would have attended the new school had it
been in existence. To assess the robustness of our results, we estimate models where we exclude
openings where the sample size in the school group changed by more than 25 percent (leaving 95
openings) and another set of models where we only use openings where the value of wj for the
best match is at least 0.75 (leaving 48 openings).
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